First Report

to the
Secretary of the Navy

Covering our Peacetime Navy and our Wartime Navy
and including combat operations up to 1 March 1944

by
Admiral Ernest J. King
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations

(Issued 23 April 1944)

UNITED STATES FLEET

Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

27 March 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In view of the importance and complexity of our naval operations and the tremendous expansion of our naval establishment since we entered the war, I present to you at this time a report of progress.

It is of interest to note that the date of this report happens to be on the 150th anniversary of the passage by Congress of a bill providing for the first major ships of the United States Navy--the 44-gun frigates Constitution, United States, President and Chesapeake, and the 36-gun frigates Constellation and Congress.

This report includes combat operations up to 1 March 1944. I know of no reason why it should not be made public.

Ernest J. King
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations

The Honorable Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C.

Introduction

FOR more than two years, the United States has been engaged in world- wide war. Our geographical position, our wealth, resources and industrial development, combined with an unfaltering will to victory have established and enhanced our position as one of the dominant powers among the United Nations. As such we have been closely and deeply involved with our Allies in all the political, economic and military problems and undertakings which constitute modern war. Historically, the conduct of war by allies has rarely been effective or harmonious. The record of the United Nations in this regard, during the past two years, has been unprecedented, not only in the extent of its success but in the smooth working and effective cooperation by which it has been accomplished. As one of the United Nations, the United States has reason to be proud of the inter-Allied aspects of its conduct of the war, during the past two years.

As a national effort, the war has shown the complete dependence of all military undertakings on the full support of the nation in the fields of organization, production, finance, and morale. Our military services have had that support in a full degree.

The Navy has also had full support from the nation with respect to manpower. Personnel of our regular Navy, who, in time of peace, serve as a nucleus for expansion in time of war, now represent a small portion of the total number of officers and men. About ninety per cent of our commissioned personnel and about eighty per cent of our enlisted personnel are Naval Reserves, who have successfully adapted themselves to active service in a comparatively short time. Thanks to their hard work, their training, and their will to become assets their performance of duty has been uniformly as excellent as it has been indispensable to our success.

As to the purely military side of the war, there is one lesson which stands out above all others. This is that modern warfare can be effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the military power of the Nation on the ground, at sea, and from the air. This report deals primarily with the Navy's part in the war, but it would be an unwarranted, though an unintended, distortion of perspective, did not the Navy record here its full appreciation of the efficient, whole-hearted and gallant support of the Navy's efforts by the ground, air and service forces of the Army, without which much of this story of the Navy's accomplishments would never have been written.

During the period of this report, the Navy, like the full military power of the Nation, has been a team of mutually supporting elements. The Fleet, the shore establishment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the WAVES the Seabees, have all nobly done their parts. Each has earned an individual "well done"-but hereafter are all included in the term, "The Navy."

Chapter I
The Peacetime Navy

Prior to the War in Europe

THE fundamental United States naval policy is "To maintain the Navy in strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to guard the United States and its continental and overseas possessions."

In time of peace, when the threats to our national security change with the strength and attitude of other nations in the world who have a motive for making war upon us and who are-or think they are-strong enough to do so, it is frequently difficult to evaluate those threats and translate our requirements into terms of ships and planes and trained men. It is one thing to say that we must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the naval strength adequate for that purpose.

In the years following World War I, our course was clear enough-to make every reasonable effort to preserve world peace by eliminating the causes of war and failing in that effort, to do our best to stay clear of war, while recognizing that we might fail in doing so. For a number of years, the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in the foreseeable future appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical position gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of national economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with a comparatively small Navy. Stated in terms of personnel this meant an average of about 7,900 commissioned officers, all of whom had chosen the Navy as a career, and 100,000 enlisted men more or less.

This modest concept of an adequate Navy carried with it an increased responsibility on the part of the Navy to maintain itself at the peak of operational and material efficiency, with a nucleus of highly trained personnel as a basis for war time expansion.

For twenty years in its program of readiness, our Navy has worked under schedules of operation, competitive training and inspection, unparalleled in any other Navy of the world. Fleet problems, tactical exercises, amphibious operations with the Marines and Army, aviation, gunnery, engineering, communications were all integrated in a closely packed annual operation schedule. This in turn was supplemented by special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in the fundamentals of their duties and at the same time give them the background of experience so necessary for sound advances in the various techniques of naval warfare. Ship competitions established for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were climaxed by realistic fleet maneuvers held once a year, with the object of giving

Plate 1: Status of Combatant Vessels U.S. Navy, 1923 to 1944

officers in the higher commands experience and training in strategy and tactics approximating these responsibilities in time of war.

Our peacetime training operations, which involved hard work and many long hours of constructive thinking, were later to pay us dividends. For example, it would be an understatement to say merely that the Navy recognized the growing importance of air power. By one development after another, not only in the field of design and equipment, but also in carrier and other operational techniques-such as dive bombing-and in strategic and tactical employment, the United States Navy has made its aviation the standard by which all other naval aviation is judged and has contributed its full share to the advances which were to make aviation the sine qua non of modern warfare. It may be stated here, with particular reference to naval aviation, that the uniform success which has characterized our naval air operations is unmistakably the result of an organization which was based on the conviction that air operations should be planned, directed and executed by naval officers who are naval aviators, and that in mixed forces naval aviation should be adequately represented in the command and staff organization.

Size and Composition

The effects of treaty limitations on our Navy are too well known to require more than a brief review. In 1922, under the terms of the Washington Arms Conference, limitations upon capital ships and aircraft carriers were agreed upon, the ratio established being five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan. Pursuant to that treaty, the United States scrapped a number of battleships, but was permitted to convert Lexington and Saratoga, then under construction as battle cruisers, to aircraft carriers. Whatever the other effects of the treaty, that particular provision has worked to our advantage because those two ships, as battle cruisers, would now be obsolescent, and as aircraft carriers they were-and Saratoga still is-effective units of our fleet.

In 1930, at London, the parties to the 1922 treaty agreed upon further limitations, this time with respect to cruisers, destroyers and submarines. As a result of these two treaties, which reflected world conditions at the time, and also because of our decision to maintain our Navy at considerably less strength than that allowed by the treaties, we experienced a partial building holiday that threw our small construction program out of balance. Except for cruisers, hardly any combatant ships (no battleships or destroyers) were added to our fleet during that period, and few were under construction. In size, therefore, our Navy remained static, with certain types approaching obsolescence. Moreover, advances in the science of naval construction were hampered by the lack of opportunity to prove new designs. As the accompanying chart (Plate 1) indicates, our naval strength was at low ebb during the year 1927.

Our failure to build progressively was a mistake which it is to be hoped will never be repeated. When a total building holiday in any type of ship is prolonged, and there is no opportunity to proceed on a trial and error basis, our designers are placed under handicaps taking years to overcome.

In 1924, and again in 1929, in response to representations to the effect that we were dangerously deficient in cruisers even in a world at peace, the Congress authorized

the construction of a number of cruisers. These were appropriated for from time to time, as were ships of certain other types (except battleships), usually one or two at a time.

In 1933 our building program was stepped up materially by the authorization for the construction of two new aircraft carriers, four more cruisers, 20 destroyers and four submarines. The two carriers were considerably different in design from those previously built. The other types were more evolutionary as to new features, with the possible exception of the Brooklyn class of cruisers, which were to a degree a departure from former light cruisers, both as to ship design and armament. These cruisers were notable for their six-inch guns which combined light but strong construction with rapid loading, giving them a volume of fire far greater than any other light cruisers then-or now-in existence.

In the previous year, eight destroyers of the Farragut class had been laid down. These were the first of a long series of new designs which had been improved in each succeeding class up to the latest type laid down in 1943. The 1933 program, which was considered large at the time, used the Farragut type of armament, not only for destroyers but for the broadside batteries of the larger ships, because of the five-inch 38 caliber dual purpose gun which, because of its power, reliability and extremely rapid loading, proved to be the best naval antiaircraft gun of comparable caliber.

In March 1934, the Congress authorized but did not appropriate for a Navy of treaty strength.

In 1935, in anticipation of making replacements under the terms of the treaties, work was begun on the design of battleships of the North Carolina class. Original designs (completed in 1937) included many features which have proved to be of great importance in the war; namely, increased armor protection against bombs and gunfire, heavy fragment protection around important control stations, modern five inch antiaircraft weapons, good torpedo protection, and excellent speed and steering qualities for rapid maneuvering. Contract designs for the South Dakota and Iowa classes were completed in 1938 and 1939, respectively. Most of these ships did not come into service until after the war had been declared.

The 6000-ton Atlanta class cruisers, featuring powerful antiaircraft batteries, were designed in 1937.

In 1938, foreseeing the submarine menace, an experimental program for patrol vessels was started. At the same time the motor torpedo boat was started through a series of developmental stages.

In 1938, it had become apparent that in spite of all efforts on the part of the United States to reach an agreement covering limitation of armaments, and thus to establish at least the probability of world peace, other nations were increasing their navies at an accelerating rate. At that time, in spite of the fact that there was a general desire on the part of most people everywhere in all countries of the world to remain at peace, about one-fourth of the world's population was engaged in war, and civilians were being driven from their homes and subjected to bombing attacks. In view of the situation, the President, in his message to the Congress, recommended an increase of 20 per cent in our naval strength, exclusive of replacements permitted under the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934. In May 1938, the Congress authorized the recommended

program, giving us, on paper, what appeared to be reasonably adequate naval strength.

The so-called agreement at Munich was such as to require an upward revision of the defense requirements of this country. Subsequent events in 1939 resulting in the outbreak of the war in Europe not only confirmed those estimates, but made our building up to them a matter of urgency. A great increase in design activity, in preparation for later building programs, began at this time. War had become a distinct possibility.

As Affected by the War in Europe

As a result of Germany's policy of expansion by political, economic and military aggression, culminating in the invasion of Poland, the European war began on 3 September 1939. While our position was for the time being not clearly established, it was nevertheless apparent that this war would affect the United States in a degree which might extend to our becoming involved in a war for our national existence.

The Limited Emergency

The first step taken by the United States was the declaration of the limited emergency by the President on 8 September 1939. The immediate effect of this, so far as the Navy was concerned, was to fix the authorized enlisted personnel strength of the Navy at 191,000 instead of 131,485, and to authorize the recall to active duty of officers and men and nurses on the retired and reserve lists of the Navy and Marine Corps. Other direct effects were that the procurement of materials and equipment, and the taking over of land needed for military purposes, could be accomplished more readily. Also, the Coast Guard could be made a part of the Navy if it appeared desirable, by Presidential order. Indirectly, the limited emergency was responsible for changes in contracting authority which eliminated competitive bidding, and for the suspension of certain labor provisions relating to hours of work on government contracts.

Neutrality

On 2 October 1939, the Congress of American Republics assembled at Panama agreed upon a resolution which established a neutral zone surrounding the Americas, with the exception of Canada, at an average distance of 300 miles. By the terms of the resolution, belligerent raiders and submarines were to be prevented from operating close to the Western Hemisphere, as they had done in World War I, the thought responsible for the resolution being that if belligerent operations took place in that area, the United States and her Latin American neighbors might well become involved in the war. The United States Navy being the only armed force equal to the task of maintaining patrol in this extensive area, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the proclamation was obvious. The patrol was in fact taken by the United States Navy, and at that time a portion of the 111 decommissioned destroyers were recommissioned for the purpose of making it effective.

Preceded by heated debates, during which it was argued that, for insufficient reason, we would be abandoning our traditional policy of freedom of the seas, the Neutrality Act of 1939 became law on 4 November 1939, and American vessels and

citizens were thereby prohibited from entering combat zones. The Act also established a so-called cash and carry policy, under which all belligerents were required to do their own transporting of goods purchased in the United States, and pay for them before being granted clearance. In addition, it authorized the President to place restrictions on the use of ports and territorial waters of the United States by submarines or merchant vessels of foreign states (pursuant to which he prohibited their use by foreign submarines of belligerent states, except when there by force majeure) and prohibited the use of United States ports as bases for furnishing men and supplies to ships of belligerent states lying off those ports. Other consequences of the Neutrality Act were to make effective certain laws previously enacted, having for their purpose the maintenance of neutrality. These included prohibitions against sending our armed vessels for delivery to belligerents, and contained provisions for detaining armed vessels or vessels manifestly built for warlike purposes or conversion thereto. Included, also, insofar as detention and permissible length of stay were concerned, were laws covering the use of our ports by foreign vessels.

Naval Expansion

In view of the situation, our requirements as to naval strength were again presented to the Congress, in January 1940. At that time, the part the United States was to play in the war was still not clear, but with due regard for our national safety and with aggressor nations disregarding treaties and pacts without hesitation--the immediate result being rapid changes in the international situation--Congress recognized that our security would be measured by our ability to defend ourselves. Coupled with this uncertainty was the knowledge that the international situation had been very difficult to predict. Many keen observers were certain that no European war would break out in 1939, and there were others who felt that we would be able to stay out of the war.

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Navy Department, and following a careful examination of world conditions, the Congress authorized an expansion of 11 per cent in our combatant ships, and the President signed the bill on 14 June 1940.

Meanwhile, the aggressor nations had succeeded in imposing their will upon numerous European countries. Germany had disposed of France and had overrun the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Poland, and stood on the Channel coast, poised for an all out attack on Britain. In view of that alarming situation, the Congress passed the so-called Two-Ocean Navy Bill, which was signed by the President on 19 July 1940. The increase in our naval strength authorized by this Act was 1,325,000 tons of combatant ships--by far the largest naval expansion ever authorized. This authorization was followed by the necessary appropriations in due course, and, in the making, we had a Navy commensurate with our needs.

The Destroyer-Naval Base Exchange

During the summer of 1940, the Battle of Britain was in its initial stages and the German submarine campaign had been prosecuted with telling effect. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had suffered severely from the general attrition of operations at sea, particularly in destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and during the

retreat from Dunkirk. Faced with this situation, Great Britain entered into an agreement with the United States, under the terms of which 50 of our older destroyers no longer suited for the type of fleet service for which they had been designed, but still adequately suited for antisubmarine duty, were exchanged for certain rights in various localities suitable for the establishment of naval bases in the Atlantic area, and essential to the national defense. In addition to the bases acquired in return for the 50 destroyers, we were granted "freely and without consideration" similar rights with respect to the leasing of bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.

This acquisition of bases operated to advance our sea frontier several hundred miles in the direction of our potential enemies in the Atlantic, and as the bases were leased for a term of 99 years, we could profit by their strategic importance to the United States not only immediately, but long after the crisis responsible for the exchange.

The bases thus obtained by the United States were briefly as follows:

Facility Established

Location
Antigua, B.W.I.		Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
British Guiana, S.A.		Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Jamaica, B.W.I.		Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
St. Lucia, B.W.I.		Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Bermuda, B.W.I.		Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Great Exuma, Bahamas		Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Newfoundland		Naval Operating Base Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base, Air Field)
Trinidad		Naval Operating Base Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base) Lighter-than-Air Base Radio Station

Lend-Lease and its Implementation

On 11 March 1941, the so-called "Lend-Lease" Act was signed by the President. The provisions and effects of that Act are too well known to require comment in this report. Naturally, we were unwilling to see a large part of the material built with our labor and money lost in transit, and our only recourse was to give the British assistance in escorting the convoys carrying that material within North American waters.

Incident to our decision, the United States entered into an agreement with Denmark on 9 April 1941 relative to the defense of Greenland, and on that day our Marines were landed there to prevent its being used by Axis raiders. The Coast Guard cutter Cayuga had already landed a party there to conduct a survey with respect to airfields, seaplane bases, radio stations, meteorological stations and additions to navigation, and on 1 June, the first of the Greenland patrols was organized, consisting chiefly of Coast Guard vessels and personnel.

On 27 May 1941, an unlimited national emergency was proclaimed by the President.

On 7 July 1941, United States Marines were landed in Iceland and relieved some of the British forces stationed there.

On 11 August 1941, on board the United States cruiser Augusta, the President and Prime Minister of Great Britain agreed upon a joint declaration covering the principles of mutual interest to the two countries.

For some months, for the purpose of ensuring safe passage of goods shipped under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, our naval forces had been patrolling waters in the vicinity of the convoy routes, and had been broadcasting information relative to the presence of raiders. On 4 September 1941, Greer, a four-stack United States destroyer was enroute to Iceland, with mail, passengers and freight. When about 175 miles south of Iceland, she detected a submarine ahead. The submarine fired a torpedo at her and missed, whereupon Greer counterattacked with depth charges. Another torpedo was fired at Greer but it also missed, and Greer continued to Iceland. As a result of this incident, our naval forces were ordered by the President to shoot on sight any vessel attempting to interfere with American shipping, or with any shipping under American escort.

On 15 October, Kearney a new destroyer, one of a number of vessels escorting a convoy from Iceland to North America, was torpedoed amidships. Eleven of her crew were killed and seven were wounded, and the ship was badly damaged but able to make port.

On 30 October, the naval tanker Salinas was hit by two torpedoes about 700 miles east of Newfoundland. There were no casualties to personnel, and Salinas reached port safely.

On 31 October in the same vicinity Reuben James, another old destroyer, was struck amidships by a torpedo. The ship was broken in two; the forward part sank at once, but the after part stayed afloat long enough to enable 45 men to reach the deck and launch life rafts from which they were rescued. About 100 men were lost in this sinking.

Whatever the situation technically, the Navy in the Atlantic was taking a realistic viewpoint of the situation. During the month of November, further steps were taken to enable our naval forces to meet the steadily growing emergency. On 1 November the Coast Guard was made a part of the Navy. Prior to that time ten Coast Guard cutters were transferred to the British. On 17 November sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939 were repealed by an act of Congress, thereby permitting the arming of United States merchant vessels and their passage to belligerent ports anywhere.

Another effect of the European war, of major importance to the United States, was the alliance by which on 27 September 1940 Japan became one of the Axis powers.

For many years it had been predicted and expected that eventually Japan's policy of expansion would conflict with our interests in the Pacific. Recognition of that possibility, plus Japan's growing naval strength, were indicated by her being a party to the 1922 treaty on limitation of armaments, and to subsequent treaties dealing with that subject.

At the time of the 1922 treaty Pearl Harbor and Manila were fortified bases, and Guam was being fortified. None of our other Pacific territories and possessions was fortified. When, therefore, the parties to that treaty agreed to maintain the fortification of certain Pacific islands in status quo, the fortification of Guam was halted. Subsequently conforming to the treaty provisions, we maintained the status quo at Guam and Corregidor, and confined our precautionary measures in the Pacific to the strengthening of Pearl Harbor and our west coast bases.

Our foresight in developing Pearl Harbor and our west coast bases has increased, immeasurably, our ability to carry on the war in the Pacific. Whether or not Guam could have been made sufficiently strong to withstand the full force of enemy attack is of course problematical, but we appear to have had an object lesson to the effect that if we are to have outlying possessions we must be prepared to defend them.

When, in the winter of 1935-1936, the Japanese declared themselves no longer willing to abide by existing treaty provisions or be a party to further negotiations, it gave rise to a feeling of uneasiness concerning the trend of Japanese policy and activities. Unfortunately, the full import of that move did not become apparent until later.

In 1931, Japan had embarked on a policy of aggression by the seizure of Manchuria. This was followed by other conquests in China, and as we have since learned, was accompanied by the fortifying of certain islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, in direct violation of the treaty provisions. A complete history of our relations with Japan during the period 1931-1941 was issued by the State Department in the so-called "White Paper" dated 2 January 1943.

Continuing her aggression, Japan moved into French-Indo China in 1940. In 1941, the United States was engaged in protesting these and other moves, and while conversations with the Japanese were being held, the German offensive in Russia was being successfully pressed. It seems likely that this influenced the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Whatever the reasons, Japan, while her representatives in Washington were still engaged in discussions, presumably with a view to finding a means of preventing war, on the morning of 7 December 1941 attacked our ships at Pearl Harbor. The attack was essentially an air raid, although there were some 45-ton submarines which participated. The primary objectives of the Japanese were clearly the heavy ships in the harbor and our grounded Army and Navy planes were destroyed in order to prevent them from impeding the attack. Damage done to the light surface forces and the industrial plant was incidental. Of the eight battleships in the harbor, Arizona was wrecked, Oklahoma capsized and three other battleships were so badly damaged that they were resting on bottom. The damages to the other three were comparatively minor in character. A total of 19 ships was hit, including three light cruisers which were not seriously damaged. Three destroyers were hit and badly damaged. (All three were later restored to service.) Of the 202 Navy planes ready for use on that morning only 52 were able to take the air after the raid.

Personnel casualties were in proportion to the material damage. The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a loss of 2,117 officers and men killed and 960 missing.

The Japanese losses were about 60 planes, attributable mainly to antiaircraft fire, and it is probable that others were unable, on account of lack of fuel, to return to the carriers which composed the striking force.

A few hours later a similar but less damaging attack was made on the Philippines. (The situation in the Far East is described elsewhere in this report.)

On the following day we declared ". . . that a state of war which has thus been thrust upon the United States by the Imperial Government of Japan is hereby formally declared." On 11 December a similar declaration was made concerning Germany and Italy.

Chapter II
The Wartime Navy

Fighting Strength

Armaments

THE world diplomatic situation had been deteriorating for some years, and Europe had been at war since September 1939. For those reasons, we had been adding to our fleet from time to time, beginning in 1933, but our decision to prepare ourselves fully for the inevitable conflict may be considered to have been made when the so-called Two-Ocean Navy Bill became law on 19 July 1940. At that time, we had to consider the possible disappearance of British sea power. England itself was threatened and its capture by the Germans would have meant the loss of the Royal Navy's home bases and the industrial establishments. These, we could readily see, would become very tangible assets indeed, in the event that we were drawn into the war.

In round numbers, provision for a "two-ocean Navy" meant an expansion of about 70 per cent in our combat tonnage--the largest single building program ever undertaken by the United States or any other country.

Upon the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the Navy Department initiated expansion of naval shipbuilding facilities in private yards and in Navy yards. In many instances, particularly in Navy yards, the expansion provided facilities which were to be available for repairs as well as new construction.

By 19 July 1940, when the two-ocean Navy was authorized, the program for expanding facilities was well started, and it continued thereafter at an accelerating rate until the early part of 1943. Early in the period of the shipyard expansion, it was apparent that as the new programs for cargo ships, tanks, planes, and Army and Navy equipment of all kinds started to pyramid, the country's latent manufacturing capacity would soon be overloaded. Thus the problem became not merely one of expanding shipyards, but of expanding the manufacturing capacity of industry as a whole to meet the needs of the Navy shipbuilding program.

Expansion of general industry to meet the requirements of this shipbuilding program began with plants producing basic raw materials. Next to be enlarged were plants capable of manufacturing the component parts of a modern man-of-war ranging all the way from jewel bearings to huge turbines. So comprehensive was the building program that nearly every branch of American industry was affected either directly or indirectly. Manufacturers were encouraged to let out their work to subcontractors, particularly to plants which had been producing nonessential materials. An automobile manufacturer, for example, was given the job of producing extremely intricate gyroscopic compasses and a stone finishing concern undertook the manufacture

of towing machines and deck winches. Early in the building program an acute situation in the construction of turbo-electric propulsion machinery was solved by the construction of an enormous new plant in a 50-acre corn field. As an illustration of the speed with which the whole program was undertaken, the construction of that particular plant was not begun until May 1942, and by the end of the year the first unit had been produced, completed and shipped.

The rapidity of this naval expansion has had a profound effect upon our military strategy. As a result of it, we were enabled to seize and hold the initiative sooner than

Plate 2: Month Required for U.S. Navy Construction Before and After Pearl Harbor

we had originally anticipated, and to deal successfully with the submarine situation in the Atlantic. The former has, of course, meant a vast improvement in our military Situation everywhere and the latter was of great benefit to the shipping situation, which was very serious in the early months of the war and threatened to become more so with the prospective increases in overseas troop movements and their support. (See Plate 2.)

Immediately after the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Bill, corresponding contracts for new construction were let and there were soon more warships and auxiliaries on the ways than had ever been under construction anywhere in the world at any one time simultaneously with this new construction, the conversion of merchant ships being accomplished one of the most important of these being the escort carriers later proved so effective in combating the German submarine campaign in the

Atlantic. It is interesting to note that the conversion of these ships was superimposed upon the shipbuilding effort following enactment of the Two-Ocean Navy Bill, it having been long appreciated that sea-borne aircraft would play a dominant role in overseas campaigns if and when war came.

With a construction program well under way, it was most important to keep alterations in design at a minimum in order to avoid delays. Nevertheless, changes which would increase military effectiveness or give greater protection to crews were not sacrificed for the sake of speeding up construction. Another consideration which industry had to take in its stride was the evolution of strategic plans and changes in the type of operations which made it necessary, from time to time, to shift the emphasis in construction from one type of ship to another. For example, when the war began our carrier strength was such that we could not stand much attrition. When, therefore, we suffered the loss of four of our largest aircraft carriers in the Coral Sea engagement, at Midway, and in the South Pacific, it was imperative that the construction of vessels of this category be pushed ahead at all possible speed. Shortly after we suffered the heavy loss in battleship strength at Pearl Harbor our battleships under construction at the time were given top priority. At another stage of the war, when the submarine situation in the Atlantic was a matter of great concern, emphasis was placed upon escort carriers and destroyer escort vessels. At the moment, major emphasis rests with the construction of landing craft, because we intend to use them in large numbers in future operations.

The production of aircraft quite naturally assumed proportions commensurate with the building program. Thanks to the research and experimentation that had been done in improving and perfecting the various types of airplanes, and thanks also to the genius of United States industry in the field of mass production, our air power increased with almost incredible rapidity as soon as our airplane factories were expanded and retooled for the various models of planes we needed. In view of the delays to be expected from changes in design when on a mass production basis, it was apparent that a nice timing in changes of design would be necessary, so that the performance of our aircraft would always be more than a match for anything produced by the enemy. A notable example is the change-over from the Grumman Wildcat to the Grumman Hellcat.

In order to obtain a properly balanced navy, the construction of combatant ships was supplemented by building patrol vessels, mine craft, landing craft and auxiliary vessels of all types. Some 55 building yards and yacht basins, located in practically all areas of the United States served by navigable waters, have participated in the patrol craft construction program.

No maritime nation has ever been able to fight a war successfully without an adequate merchant marine--something we did not have when the two-ocean Navy was authorized. The Maritime Commission therefore began a vast program of merchant ship construction at the same time we were expanding the Navy, and the merchant shipbuilding industry, too, faced an enormous expansion. Furthermore, the supply of materials necessary to complete the huge program had to be carefully allocated, in view of the country's other needs that had to be met. The Navy needed material to build ships and manufacture Planes and equipment, the Army required

the material for military purposes, and civilian needs could not be neglected. In order to control the allocation of material, the War Production Board was established by the President and decisions as to priorities have since been made by that agency.

Naturally, such a great undertaking involved thousands of business transactions on the part of the Navy Department, with the contracting builders and manufacturers. These transactions have been continuous, and have been entered into on the basis of statutes which limit the profits permissible, and provide for the negotiation and renegotiation of all contracts. This part of the program has, in itself, been a colossal job.

Battleships

At the beginning of the program ten battleships were under construction. By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked only two, North Carolina and Washington, were in service, but since that time, six more have joined the fleet. These include South Dakota and three sister ships, Indiana, Massachusetts and Alabama, and two of a larger class, Iowa and New Jersey. A third ship in the latter class, Wisconsin, was launched 7 December 1943, appropriately enough, two years to the day after Pearl Harbor was attacked. In speed, in fire power, particularly antiaircraft fire, in maneuverability, and in protection, these ships represent a great advance over previous design.

Aircraft Carriers

Construction of aircraft carriers represents one of the most spectacular phases of the naval shipbuilding program. The carrier strength of the Navy on 7 December 1941 was seven first-line vessels and one escort carrier, a converted merchant ship. Contracts had been placed for several large carriers of the new Essex class, and some of these had been laid down. Conversion of a number of merchant vessels was under way. The pressing need to add to our striking power in the air and to replace losses suffered in the Pacific during 1942 led to a great expansion of the construction program for first-line carriers. Concurrently, an even larger expansion of the escort carrier program was undertaken. By the end of 1943, more than 50 carriers of all types had been put into service in our Navy, and in addition a large number of escort carriers had been transferred to Great Britain.

This remarkable record in construction enabled us in a single year to build up our carrier strength from the low point reached in the autumn of 1942, when Saratoga, Enterprise and Ranger were the only ships of our fleet carrier forces remaining afloat, to a position of clear superiority in this category. The rapidity with which new carriers of various types were put into service in 1943 influenced naval operations in many important respects. Availability of several ships of the Essex class and of a considerable number of smaller carriers, completed months ahead of schedule, contributed to the success of our operations in the Southwest Pacific, aided materially in checking the submarine menace in the Atlantic, and enabled us to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific before the end of the year.

A large proportion of the Essex class carriers have joined the fleet. Excellent progress is being made on construction of the remaining ships in the original program

and of the additional vessels in this class authorized after the Pearl Harbor attack. Nearly all of the carriers of the Independence class, converted from light cruisers, have been completed. These ships, though smaller than the Essex class vessels, are first-line carriers. It is planned to supplement these two basic types of carriers with a third, substantially larger than any of our present classes, which will displace 45,000 tons, and will be capable of handling bombing planes larger than any which heretofore have operated from the decks of aircraft carriers. They will be far more heavily armed than smaller carriers and will be much less vulnerable to bomb and torpedo attack.

The Navy's first escort carrier was the Long Island, converted early in 1941, from the merchant vessel Mormacmail. When experiments with this ship proved successful, a sizeable conversion program was initiated, using Maritime Commission C-3 hulls, and a number of oilers. In 1942, because of pressing need, this program was greatly expanded.

The "baby flat-tops" have three principal uses. They serve as antisubmarine escorts for convoys; as aircraft transports, delivering assembled aircraft to strategic areas; as combatant carriers to supplement the main air striking force of the fleet. Although their cruising speeds are lower than those of our first-line carriers, these auxiliary carriers can be turned out more rapidly and at a fraction of the cost of conventional carriers. These ships have proved invaluable in performing convoy escort and other duties for which larger and faster carriers are not needed.

Cruisers

The Baltimore class heavy cruisers, a number of which are now in service, were designed during the period from 19 July 1940 to 7 December 1941. These cruisers are considered as powerful as any heavy cruisers afloat, particularly as recent technical developments have made it possible to improve their fighting characteristics. The Cleveland type of light cruiser (a development of the Brooklyn class) was approved for a large part of the cruiser program, its design having been completed just before the expansion was authorized. The design of the large Alaska class was the result of a series of studies commenced when treaty limitations went by the board and we were no longer bound by any limitations on the size of ships.

Destroyers end Destroyer Escorts

The Fletcher class of destroyers designed just after the outbreak of the war in Europe, formed a large part of the new destroyer building program. As compared with earlier destroyers, they are larger and have greatly increased fighting power, made possible by the same technical developments that permitted similar improvements in our cruisers.

Destroyer production has been highly satisfactory, and it has been possible to expand and accelerate this part of the program in an orderly manner. Although some new yards were engaged in building destroyers the increases were made possible by expanding facilities in yards which had had experience in destroyer construction. An idea of the acceleration in the rate of delivery of destroyers may be had by comparison

with the figures for 1941 and 1943. In 1943, the rate was approximately eight times that of 1941. (See Plate 3.)

Contracts for the first destroyer escorts were let in November 1941. In January 1942, the program was increased, and as Germany stepped up the construction of

Plate 3: Destroyers--Average Monthly Production

U-boats several more increases were found necessary. Because of priorities the commencement of a large building program was delayed, but after delivery of the first vessel of the class, in February 1943, mass production methods became effective in the 17 building yards concerned The result was a phenomenal output of those very useful vessels.

Submarines

As a result of the orderly progress which had been made in the construction of submarines, involving continuous trial under service conditions, the main problem to

be solved in building more submarines was the expansion of facilities. For a period of 15 years or more, there were only three yards in the United States with the equipment and the know-how to build submarines. These were the Navy yards at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Mare Island, California, and the Electric Boat Company at Groton, Connecticut.

In addition to the expansion that took place at these yards, two other yards went into the production of submarines. One of these was the Cramp Shipbuilding Corporation of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the other was the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company at Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The building at the latter yard is a further testimonial to the ingenuity displayed throughout the entire program, in that submarines are built at Manitowoc, tested in the Great Lakes, then taken through the Chicago drainage canal, and down the Mississippi River to New Orleans, where they are made ready for sea.

Landing Craft

One of the most important achievements has been the landing craft construction program. Although the Navy had begun to experiment with small landing craft in 1936, we had only a few thousand tons in this category when we entered the war. In 1942, a billion dollar program for the construction of landing craft was superimposed on the already heavy building schedule, and the work was given top priority until the desired quota was filled. The facilities of existing public and private shipyards were given part of the burden. New yards were constructed, many of them in the Mississippi Valley, where bridge-building and steel-working companies which had had no previous experience in shipbuilding put up new plants and swung into production. In the second half of 1942, almost a quarter of a million tons of landing craft were produced, and the figure increased to well over a third of a million tons for the first half of 1943.

This production included a tremendous variety of vessels from small rubber boats to tank landing ships more than 300 feet in length. Within this range are small craft designed to carry only a few men, and ships with a capacity of 200, tracked craft capable of crawling over coral reefs or up beaches, craft for landing tanks or vehicles, craft for landing guns, craft for giving close fire support--in fact, all types necessary for success in that most difficult of military operations, landing on a hostile shore.

Airplanes

As a natural consequence of the importance of aviation in war, there has been a tremendous growth in the number of aircraft in the Navy.

Lessons learned in battle have been incorporated in the design of combat planes. New naval aircraft have larger engines and more power, increased protection for both crew and plane, and greater firepower than the models in service at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Grumman Wildcat, which served with distinction through the first year of the war, has been largely replaced by two new fighters--the Chance-Vought Corsair and the Grumman Hellcat. These two fighters were born of the war. While the Corsair existed as an experimental model before Pearl Harbor, it was so modified before going into production as to represent virtually a new plane. Offering greatly increased

speed and firepower, the Corsair went into production in June 1942, and large numbers were being sent to the war fronts by the end of the year. The Corsair was followed but in no sense succeeded by the Hellcat, which carries more armament and has greatly increased climbing ability. In production since November 1942, and in service with the fleet since September 1943, the Hellcat rounds out a powerful striking force for naval aviation. These two planes are superior to anything the Japanese have.

The Douglas Dauntless scout and dive bomber, in service when this country entered the war, has undergone successive modifications but is still in use. A new plane in this category--the Curtiss Helldiver--is now ready for the fighting front. This plane can carry a greatly increased bomb load, has more firepower, and is speedier than the Dauntless.

Twelve days after the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy approved the final experimental model of a new torpedo bomber, the Grumman Avenger. Six weeks later, this plane began coming off the production line. Undergoing its baptism of fire at the Battle of Midway, it gradually replaced the Douglas Devastator and has now become almost an all-purpose plane for the fleet. The Avenger is a speedy, strongly protected, rugged aircraft capable of delivering a torpedo attack at sea or a heavy bomb load on land targets. Since it was first put into service, its defensive armament and auxiliary equipment have been improved, and a new model introducing other improvements is almost ready for volume production.

No field of aviation has been more important to the Navy than that of long range reconnaissance and patrol. After two years of war, the Consolidated Catalina flying boat remains in active service, having proved its usefulness in performing such varied tasks as night bombing patrol, rescues, antisubmarine warfare, and even dive bombing. Since Pearl Harbor, the Catalina has been supplemented by the Martin Mariner, a larger plane, which has likewise proved to be versatile in this field.

The Navy has made increasing use of land-based patrol airplanes because of the greater speed and range of newly developed models of this type and their greater defensive ability as compared with seaplanes. With more land bases becoming available, it has been possible to utilize them effectively for long over-water operations. Their superior offensive and defensive power makes them more valuable in antisubmarine warfare and for combat reconnaissance photography and patrol.

Two principal types of land-based patrol planes are now in service with the Navy--the four-engine Consolidated Liberator and the two-engine Vega Ventura. The Navy's version of the Liberator is an extremely useful plane for fast, long range reconnaissance, search and tracking. A new version, with more powerful defensive armament and greater offensive strength, soon will be available. The Ventura is a strongly armed aircraft which carries a heavy bomb load. It has proved a powerful weapon particularly in the war against the submarine. Two other land-based bombers--the Lockheed Hudson and the Douglas Havoc--have seen limited service with the Navy and a third--the North American Mitchell--is in use by Marine air squadrons.

The principal plane used by the Navy for scout observation work during the war has been the Vought-Sikorsky Kingfisher. A newer plane in this field, now in service is the Curtiss Seagull.

The field of air transport has been enormously expanded since the beginning of

the war. The Naval Air Transport Service now operates, either directly or through contract with private airlines, more than 70,000 miles of scheduled flights to all parts of the globe, helping to maintain the Navy's long supply lines. Thus far, standard type transport planes have been used. In December 1943, however, the Martin Mars, world's largest flying boat, was accepted by the Navy after exhaustive tests which proved its ability to carry heavy loads at long range. Manufacture of the Mars, under a prime contract with the Navy, is now under way, and the first production planes of this type recently entered actual service as cargo carriers.

Auxiliaries

The tremendous increase in the number of fighting ships and the global nature of the war required the acquisition of a commensurately large fleet of auxiliaries. These ships were obtained by construction, by conversion of standard Maritime Commission commercial hulls and by acquisition and conversion of commercial vessels. A considerable number of conversions of standard Maritime Commission types have been accomplished under the supervision of the Maritime Commission. Probably the most important vessels produced under the auxiliary program during 1943 were those which take part in actual landing operations, consisting of attack transports, attack cargo vessels and general headquarters ships. The demand for repair ships of standard and special types, which increased many-fold during 1943, was met by new construction and conversion.

Patrol Craft

As previously stated, patrol vessels were necessary to a properly balanced Navy. The first group of patrol craft, whose design was developed before the war, was completed in the spring of 1942, and more than 600 vessels of this type were completed in 1943. Motor torpedo boats (which have been employed to good advantage in several different theaters) were produced at intervals in accordance with military requirements. The classification "Patrol Craft" includes the 110-foot sub-chaser and the 136- 173- and 184-foot steel vessels. The greatest emphasis on this type of ship prevailed prior to and during the German submarine offensive off our Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean.

Personnel

The expansion program and the additional requirements following the outbreak of war resulted in increases in personnel as follows. The figures given include officers and men and the Women's Reserve, but not officer candidates or nurses:

	8 Sep 1939	7 Dec 1941	31 Dec 1943
Navy	126,418	325,095	2,252,606
Marine Corps	19,701	70,425	391,620
Coast Guard	10,079	25,002	171,518

Taking the number of men indicated into an organization was in itself an enormous undertaking. Training them was an even greater undertaking, in spite of their high intelligence and the other characteristics which make the American fighting man the equal of any in the world.

Procurement of Officers

In time of peace the Navy is manned almost entirely by officers of the regular Navy, most of whom are graduates of the Naval Academy. Several years before the war, knowing that the Naval Academy would not be able to supply officers in sufficient quantities for wartime needs, the Navy established Naval reserve Officer Training Cops units at various colleges throughout the country. Under the system set up, students were given the opportunity to take courses in naval science (which included training at sea during the summer months) and, upon successfully completing them, were commissioned in the Naval Reserve. When the limited emergency was declared, these officers were ordered to active duty, but when the war broke out it became apparent that the combined supply of commissioned officers from the Naval Academy and from ROTC units would not be sufficient to meet our needs for the rapidly expanding Navy.

In February 1942, therefore, offices of naval officer procurement were established in key cities throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands of officer candidates went to these offices and there presented their qualifications. With the requirements of health, character, personality and education duly considered, the applications of those who appeared qualified were forwarded to the Navy Department for final consideration. Under this procedure some 72,000 officers were commissioned in the Navy directly from civil life, to meet immediate needs.

Meanwhile, educational programs designed to produce commissioned officers had been established in numerous colleges throughout the country. Included were the aviation cadet program (V-5) principally for physically qualified high school graduates and college students, and later the Navy college program (v-12) which absorbed undergraduate students of the accredited college program (v-1) and of the reserve midshipman program (v-7). At the present time there are 66,815 members of the V-12 program in some 241 different colleges.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that high school graduates are now the Navy's principal source of young officers. Their training is described elsewhere in this report, but the various programs for Naval Reserve officers have supplied the fleet with large numbers many of whom have already demonstrated their ability and the wisdom of the policy calling for their indoctrination and training before being sent to sea. Officers of the regular Navy are universally enthusiastic over the caliber of young reserve officers on duty in the fleet.

In general, procurement of officers has kept up with the needs of the service, With the exception of officers in the medical, dental, and chaplain corps and in certain highly specialized fields of engineering. As graduates of professional schools are the chief source of commissioned officers in the various staff corps and as there must be a balance between military and civilian needs, we are at present somewhat short of our commissioned requirements in certain branches of the service.

By comparison with the increase in size of the Naval Reserve, the increases in the regular Navy have been small. The output of the Naval Academy is at its peak, however having been stepped up by shortening the course to three years and by increasing the number of appointments. In addition, during 1943, 20,652 officers have been made by the advancement of outstanding enlisted personnel.

Recruiting of Enlisted Personnel

When the President declared the existence of a limited emergency on 8 September 1939, the personnel strength of the Navy had been increased by calling retired officers and men to active duty and by giving active duty status to members of the Naval Reserve who volunteered for it. At the time the large naval expansion was authorized in July 1940, however, there were still only slightly more than 160,000 men in the Navy and by the end of that year only 215,000. As late as June 1941, the total was still well below 300,000, and it was apparent that a radical increase over and above the existing figure was an immediate necessity. Various measures were therefore taken to stimulate recruiting, by virtue of which the Navy strength stood at 290,000 on 7 December 1941. In other words, we doubled our personnel in two years.

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor there was a large increase in enlistments, and by the end of that month some 40,000 additional men had been accepted for naval service. This heavy enlistment rate, however, experienced in December 1941 and January 1942, subsequently fell off at a time when the requirements were still mounting. In order to meet the situation and to provide an adequate method of recruiting the large numbers of men needed, our recruiting system, which had already been expanded, was fortified by a field force of officers commissioned directly from civil life, and by the fall of 1942, we were accepting each month a total equivalent to peacetime Navy strength.

On 5 December 1942, the voluntary enlistment of men between the ages of 18 and 37, inclusive, was ordered terminated as of 1 February 1943, on which latter date the manpower requirements of the Navy were supplied by operation of the machinery of the Selective Service system. During the period of active recruiting about 900,000 volunteers were accepted. Since 1 February 1943, 779,713 men have entered the Navy through Selective Service. During the same period voluntary enlistments within the age limits prescribed totaled 205,669.

On 1 June 1943 the Army and Navy agreed on joint physical standards which were somewhat lower than those previously followed by the Navy, but still sufficiently rigid to permit all inductees to be assigned to any type of duty afloat or ashore.

Training

Strictly speaking, it is probably true that training is a continuous process, which begins when an individual enters the Navy and ends when he leaves it. In time of peace the number of trained men in the Navy is relatively high. In time of war, however, particularly when we experience a personnel expansion such as has been described, trained men are at a premium. It is not an exaggeration to state that our success in this war will be in direct proportion to the state of training of our own forces.

When we entered the war we experienced a dilution in trained men in new ships because of the urgency of keeping trained men where fighting was in progress, and initial delays in getting underway with the huge expansion and training program had to be accepted. As the war progressed, and as the enemy offensive was checked, we were able to assign larger numbers of our trained men to train other men. Our ability to expand and train during active operations reflects the soundness of our

peacetime training and organization. With that as a foundation on which to build, and with the tempo of all training stepped up, adequate facilities, standardized curricula, proper channeling of aptitude, full use of previous related knowledge, lucid instructions and top physical condition became the criteria for wartime training.

Generally speaking, the first stage in the training of any new member of the Navy is to teach him what every member of the Navy must know, such as his relationship with others, the wearing of the uniform, the customs of the service, and how to take care of himself on board ship. The second stage involves his being taught a specialty and being thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals of that specialty. The third stage is to fit him into the organization and teach him to use his ability to the best advantage.

Commissioned Personnel

The over-all problem of training officers involves a great deal more than the education of the individual in the ways of the Navy. The first step is classification according to ability, which must be followed by appropriate assignment to duty. This is particularly true in the case of Reserve officers, who must be essentially specialists, because there is insufficient time to devote to the necessary education and training to make them qualified for detail to more than one type of duty.

As previously stated, ROTC units, which were part of the V-1 training program, had been established in various colleges, and courses in naval science, which included drills and summer cruises, were worked into the academic careers of the individuals enrolled. With the approach of war, the training of these students was shortened in most colleges to two and one-half years, and eventually they became part of the Navy college training program (v-12).

In 1935, the Congress authorized the training of naval aviation cadets, and that statutory authority was implemented by a program for their training, known as the V-5 program, which was open to physically qualified high school graduates and college students. Under the methods adopted, a decision as to whether or not a candidate would be accepted for the V-5 program was made by Naval Aviation Cadet Selection Boards, who were guided by high standards covering the educational, moral, physical and psychological qualifications of each individual. The period of training normally requires from 12 to 15 months, exclusive of additional college training required for 17-year-old students. Of this time, six to eight months are spent in preliminary training in physical education and ground school subjects at pre-flight schools. The remainder of the training consists of primary, intermediate and advanced flight training. Upon successful completion of the full flight training course, an aviation cadet is commissioned ensign in the Naval Reserve or second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve and is then ordered to active duty as a pilot.

The V-12 (Navy college training) program was established on 1 July 1943. It consisted initially of students who were on inactive duty in the Naval Reserve, new students from civilian life, and young enlisted men especially selected. The new students from civilian life consist of selected high school graduates or others with satisfactory educational qualifications who can establish by appropriate examination their mental, physical and potential officer qualifications. These students are then inducted

into the Navy as apprentice seamen or as privates, United States Marine Corps, placed on active duty, and assigned to designated colleges and universities to follow courses of study specified by the Navy Department.

v-12 training embodies most of the features of preceding Naval Reserve programs. Depending on training requirements, and with the exception of medical and dental officers, engineering specialists, and chaplains, length of courses vary from two to six semesters. The courses of study include fundamental college work in mathematics, science, English, history, naval organization and general naval indoctrination for the first two terms for all students. This is followed by specialized training in a particular field, assignment of a student to special training being based upon his choice and upon his demonstrated competence in the field chosen, subject to available quotas. Upon satisfactory completion of college training, students are assigned to further training in the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, and if found qualified after completion of that training they are commissioned in the appropriate reserve.

So far, the V-12 program has worked well. It permits the selection of the country's best qualified young men on a broad democratic basis without regard for financial resources, and the induction and training of those young men who show the greatest promise of having superior ability and the other qualities likely to make a good officer.

The link between the College Training Program and the fleets is the Naval Reserve Midshipman Program. The Navy college graduates who are going to deck and engineering duties with the forces afloat are sent to one of the six reserve midshipman schools for a four months' course. Upon the successful completion of the first month's study, they are appointed reserve midshipmen, and after the remaining three months' intensive training, they are appointed ensigns in the Naval Reserve.

Originally four Reserve midshipmen schools were established, located at Columbia University, Northwestern University, Notre Dame, and the Naval Academy. The program has been such an outstanding success, and the demand for its graduates has so increased, that two additional schools recently have been put into commission, at Cornell and at Plattsburg, New York, with the result that there are nearly 9,000 men in this training program at any one time. The combined result of the College Training Program and the Reserve Midshipman Program is to meet the need of the fleets for thoroughly trained young deck and engineering officers.

Enlisted Personnel

Recruit training, in addition to the instruction given the individual in the ways of the Navy, consists of his being fully informed of the training opportunities open to him. This is followed by a series of tests designed to determine the ability of each recruit. These tests are based on the type of duty to be performed in the Navy, and in addition to such tests as the general classification test, consists of a systematic determination of aptitudes in reading and mechanical ability and any knowledge of specific work. Through a system of personal interviews these tests are supplemented by considering the background and experience of the individual, so that the special qualifications of each recruit may be evaluated. This information is then indexed and recorded and used in establishing quotas for the detail of men to special service schools or to any other duty for which they seem best qualified.

While the recruit is learning about the Navy, therefore, the Navy is learning about him. A practical application of this system was the assembly of the crew for New Jersey, a new battleship. While the ship was fitting out, a series of tests and a thorough study of the requirements of each job on board were conducted. For example, special tests determined those best fitted to be telephone talkers or night lookouts or gun captains, and as a result, when the crew went aboard each man was assigned to a billet in keeping with his aptitude for it.

As permanent establishments, we had four training stations-Newport, Rhode Island; Norfolk, Virginia; Great Lakes, Illinois, and San Diego, California. As soon as we entered the war it became apparent that it would be necessary to expand these four stations radically and to establish others. By November 1942, we had expanded the four permanent training stations and established new ones at Bainbridge, Maryland; Sampson, New York, and Farragut, Idaho.

The training in the fundamentals of the specialty to be followed by a newcomer to the Navy is carried on ashore and afloat. Recruits showing the most aptitude for a particular duty are sent to special service schools designed to give the individual a thorough grounding in his specialty before assuming duties on board ship. If he hopes to become an electrician's mate he may be assigned to the electrical school; if a machinist's mate, to the machinist's mate school; if a commissary steward, to the cook's and baker's school, and so forth. Approximately 32 per cent of those who receive recruit training are assigned to special service schools.

An advanced type of training is given men who are already skilled in a specialty by assembling them and training them to work as a unit. This is known as operational training, and in addition to the special meaning of the term as applied to aviation training, it encompasses such special activities as bomb disposal units as well as the training of ship's crews before the ship is commissioned.

When the individual goes on board ship, he discovers that his training has only begun, because he must learn how to apply the knowledge he has already gained and how his performance of duty fits into the organization of the ship. This is another form of operational training-conducted, of course, by the forces afloat-which is a preliminary to the assignment of that ship as a unit of the fleet. This does not mean that the ship is fully trained, but it means that the training is sufficiently advanced to fit the crew for the additional training and seasoning that comes only with wartime operations at sea. With the proper background of training, the most efficient ship is very likely to be the one which has been in action. In other words, actual combat is probably the best training of all, provided the ship is ready for it.

Health

The health of the personnel in our naval forces has been uniformly excellent. In addition, the treatment and prevention of battle casualties has become progressively

The Medical Corps of the Navy has not only kept up with scientific developments everywhere, but it has taken the lead in many fields. The use of sulfa drugs, blood plasma and penicillin plus the treatment of war neuroses, probably represent

the outstanding medical accomplishments of the war, but all activities requiring medical attention have been under continuous study.

For example, the conditions under which submarines must operate have been found to require special diet, air conditioning, sun lamps, special attention to heat fatigue, and careful selection of personnel. Similarly, in the field of aviation medicine, such matters as supply of oxygen, decompression treatment, acceleration stresses, air sickness, and fatigue, require the closest attention. In the case of aviation medicine, flight surgeons, who are themselves qualified naval aviators and therefore familiar with all aviation problems, have been instrumental in keeping our aviation personnel at the peak of their efficiency.

Naval mobile hospitals were developed shortly before the war. These are complete units, capable of handling any situation requiring medical attention. Each unit contains officers of the Medical Corps, the Dental Corps, the Hospital Corps, the Nurse Corps, the Supply Corps, the Civil Engineer Corps and the Chaplain Corps, and in addition, enlisted personnel of a wide variety of non-medical ratings such as electricians, cooks, and bakers. Mobile hospitals are organized and commissioned, and being mobile as the name implies, are placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, for such duty as may be deemed desirable, the same as a ship. These mobile hospitals have proved invaluable in all theaters.

While it is hardly possible to single out any one activity as outstanding, the practice of evacuating sick and wounded personnel from forward areas by plane to be treated elsewhere has been estimated to have increased the efficiency of treatment by about one-third. The beneficial effects of this practice on our ability to carry on a prolonged campaign, such as in the Solomon Islands, are obvious.

There have been many more contributions to our military efficiency having to do with not only medicine, but health in general. The question of malaria control in the Solomon Islands, protective clothing, the survival of personnel in lifeboats, the purification of drinking water, the treatment of flash burns, the recording by tag of first aid treatment received in the field, and periodic thorough physical examinations are a few of the progressive measures which, collectively, have been responsible for marked increases in our military efficiency.

The Marine Corps

Statistics previously given indicate the personnel expansion of the Marine Corps. In terms of combat units those figures represent a ground combat strength of two half-strength divisions and seven defense battalions expanded to four divisions, 19 defense battalions and numerous force and Corps troop organizations and service units; 12 aviation squadrons expanded to 85; and increases in ships detachments to keep pace with the ship construction program. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General (now General, Retired) T.H. Holcomb, USMC, the Marine Corps successfully met the greatest test in its history by forging a huge mass of untrained officers and men into efficient tactical units especially organized, equipped, and trained for the complicated amphibious operations which have characterized the war in the Pacific.

Training of the expanding Marine Corps personnel had to be conducted by stages because existing bases were inadequate in housing, space, and facilities. Basic

training for all Marines was continued at the established recruit depots at Parris Island South Carolina, and San Diego, California. Specialized advanced training for ground and aviation personnel before being assigned to combat units was conducted chiefly at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina; at Camp Elliott, near San Diego, California; and at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California. Improvised facilities were used at those three bases until they had been developed into centers capable of affording training in all the basic and special techniques required in amphibious warfare. The final stage of training began with assignment of personnel to combat unitS and ended with the movement of those units to combat areas. (The effectiveness of individual and unit training of the Marine Corps was first demonstrated at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, eight months after the beginning of the war. That first test showed Marine Corps training methods to be sound and capable of producing combat units in a minimum of time.)

The commissioned personnel of the expanding Marine Corps were initially obtained from reservists and graduates of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. Later, commissioned personnel were obtained by including the Marine Corps in the Navy V-12 program, by selecting candidates from graduates of designated colleges and universities, and by increasing the number of enlisted men promoted to commissioned rank.

Marine Corps aviation, while expanding to a greater degree than the Corps as a whole, has continued to specialize in the providing of air support to troops in landing or subsequent ground operations. Training and organization in the United States and excellent equipment have made it possible to operate planes from hastily constructed airfields with limited facilities. The generally excellent performance of Marine aviation squadrons operating from forward bases in the Central and South Pacific areas in successful attacks against enemy aircraft, men-of-war, and shipping attests the soundness of the organization.

In November 1942, the Marine Corps Women's Reserve was established, the authorized strength being 1000 commissioned and 18,000 enlisted women, to be reached by 30 June 1944. By 31 December 1943 there were 609 officers and 12,592 enlisted women in the organization, all of whom have released male Marines for service in combat areas. The remarks relating to the performance of duty of the WAVES contained in that part of this report covering their organization and training, are equally applicable to women in the Marine Corps.

Participation of Marines in combat is covered in Part III of this report.

The Coast Guard

The duties of the Coast Guard under naval administration consist of the civil functions normally performed by the Coast Guard in time of peace which become military functions in time of war, and the performance of naval duties for which the personnel of the Coast Guard are particularly fitted by reason of their peacetime employment. The organization operates separately with respect to appropriations required for Coast Guard vessels, shore stations, and personnel.

The increase in the size of the Coast Guard was necessitated chiefly by additional duties in connection with captain-of-the-port activities in the regulation of merchant

shipping, the supervision of the loading of explosives, and the protection of shipping, harbors, and waterfront facilities. In addition, the complements of Coast Guard vessels and shore establishments were brought up to wartime strength; certain transports and other naval craft, including landing barges, were manned by Coast Guard personnel; and a beach patrol (both mounted and afoot) and coastal lookout stations were established. The Coast Guard also undertook the manning and operating of Navy section bases and certain inshore patrol activities formerly manned by naval personnel, and furnished sentries and sentry dogs for guard duty at various naval shore establishments.

Coast Guard aviation, which is about three times its previous size, has been under the operational control of sea frontier commanders for convoy coverage and for antisubmarine patrol and rescue duties. Other squadrons outside of the United States are employed in ice observation and air-sea rescue duty. Miscellaneous duties assigned to Coast Guard aviation include aerial mapping and checking for the Coast and Geodetic Survey and ice observation assistance on the Great Lakes.

The assignment of certain Coast Guard personnel to duties radically different from those they normally perform required numerous changes in ratings. This resulted in extensive classification and retraining programs designed to prepare men for their new duties. The replacement of men on shore jobs by SPARS, both officer and enlisted, has been undertaken as a part of this retraining program. Approximately 10,000 SPARS--whose performance of duty and value to the service is on a par with that of the WAVES and the women of the Marine Corps--will be commissioned and enlisted when the contemplated strength of that organization is reached.

The present strength of the Coast Guard was attained by the establishment of the Coast Guard Reserve and by commissioning warrant officers and enlisted men for temporary service. Other increases in the commissioned personnel of the Coast Guard have been accomplished by appointments made direct from civil life in the case of individuals with particular qualifications, such as special knowledge in the prevention and control of fires, police protection and merchant marine inspection.

A feature peculiar to the Coast Guard is the Temporary Reserve, which consists of officers and enlisted men enrolled to serve without pay. Members of the Temporary Reserve have full military status while engaged in the performance of such duties as pilotage, port security, the guarding of industrial plants, either on a full or part-time basis. At the present time there are about 70,000 members of the Temporary Reserve, but it is anticipated that it will eventually be reduced to about 50,000. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, which is a civilian organization, has contributed much of its manpower to the Temporary Reserve, the result being a substantial saving in manpower to the military services.

Under the general direction of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R.R. Waesche, USCG, Commandant, the Coast Guard has done an excellent job in all respects, and as a component part of the Navy in time of war, has demonstrated an efficiency and flexibility which has been invaluable in the solution of the multiplicity of problems assigned. The organization and handling of local defense in the early days of the war were particularly noteworthy.

The Seabees

For some months before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor we had been strengthening our insular outposts in the Pacific by construction of various fortifications. When these islands were attacked by the Japanese, the construction was only partially completed, and the civilians who were employed there by various construction companies were subjected to attack, along with our garrisons of Marines.

In that situation, the civilians were powerless to aid the military forces present because they lacked the weapons and the knowledge of how to use them. Furthermore, they lacked what little protection a military uniform might have given them. As a consequence, the Navy Department decided to establish and organize naval construction battalions whose members would be not only skilled construction workers but trained fighters as well.

On 28 December 1941 authorization was obtained for the first contingent of "Seabees" (the name taken from the words "Construction Battalions") and a recruiting campaign was begun. The response was immediate, and experienced men representing about 60 different trades were enlisted in the Navy and given ratings appropriate to the degree and type of their civilian training.

After being enlisted these men were sent to training centers where they were given an intensive course in military training, toughened physically, and in general educated in the ways of the service. Particular attention was paid to their possible employment in amphibious operations. Following their initial training, the Seabees were formed into battalions, so organized that each could operate as a self-sustained unit and undertake any kind of base building assignment. They were sent to advance base depots for outfitting and for additional training before being sent overseas.

The accomplishments of the Seabees have been one of the outstanding features of the war. In the Pacific, where the distances are great and the expeditious construction of bases is frequently of vital importance, the construction accomplished by the Seabees has been of invaluable assistance. Furthermore, the Seabees have participated in practically every amphibious operation undertaken thus far, landing with the first waves of assault troops to bring equipment ashore and set up temporary bases of operation.

In the Solomon Islands campaign, the Seabees demonstrated their ability to outbuild the Japs and to repair airfields and build new bases, regardless of conditions of weather. Other specialized services performed by the Seabees include the handling of pontoon gear, the repair of motor vehicles, loading and unloading of cargo vessels, and in fact every kind of construction job that has to be done.

At present the Seabees number slightly more than 240,000, nearly half of whom are serving overseas at various outposts. Fleet commanders have been and are generous in their praise and appreciation of the work done by construction battalions everywhere. There can be no doubt that the Seabees constitute an invaluable component of our Navy.

The WAVES

Early in 1942, when the need for expansion of naval personnel became acute, Navy Department proposed to the Congress that there be established, as an

integral part of the Navy, a Women's Reserve. The stated purpose of the proposal was to employ women in shore billets, so that men could be released for sea duty. Acting on that recommendation, the Women's Reserve was established on 30 July 1942, and the organization became known as the WAVES the name being derived from the expression "Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service." In November 1943, certain statutory changes were made which provided for women becoming eligible for all allowances or benefits to which men are entitled, and made certain alterations in the composition of the organization, chiefly with respect to promotions.

Initial plans called for 1000 officers and 10,000 enlisted women, and immediately upon obtaining the necessary statutory authority for the organization, officer training schools were established, at Northampton and South Hadley, Massachusetts, utilizing the facilities of Smith and Mount Holyoke Colleges. At the same time, a training school for yeomen was established at Stillwater, Oklahoma, one for radio personnel at Madison, Wisconsin, and one for storekeepers at Bloomington, Indiana. Under the procedure followed at that time all WAVES went to one of these schools immediately after joining the Navy, and upon the successful completion of their training, to duty somewhere in the continental United States where they could take the place of men.

All officer candidates now go to Northampton for their indoctrinational training and may then receive further training elsewhere--there are 16 schools for special training--in communications, supply, aerological engineering, Japanese language, radio and electronics, chemical warfare, general ordnance and photographic interpretation, and many others, including air navigation, air gunnery, and ship and aircraft recognition.

All enlisted WAVES now go to a general indoctrination school at Hunter College in New York City, and there receive their basic training. Further training at some other school--there are now 19 of them--designed to train them in their chosen specialty, is now standard practice. Enlisted personnel are trained as radio operators, yeomen, storekeepers, for various aviation ratings, and for many others, including pharmacist's mate. Approximately one-fourth of all enlisted women are now on duty with naval aviation activities.

On 31 December 1943 there were 6,459 commissioned WAVES and 40,391 enlisted WAVES serving in various capacities. Present plans call for nearly 100,000 WAVES by the end of 1944.

The organization has been a success from the beginning, partly because of the high standards WAVES had to meet to be accepted, partly because no effort has been spared to see that they are properly looked out for, and partly because of their overpowering desire to make good. As a result of their competence, their hard work, and their enthusiasm, the release of men for sea duty has been accompanied in many cases, particularly in offices, by increases in efficiency. The natural consequence is an esprit de corps which enhances their value to the Navy, and it is a pleasure to report that in addition to their having earned an excellent reputation as a part of the Navy, they have become an inspiration to all hands in naval uniform.

Chapter III
Combat Operations

General
Organization of the United States Fleet

On 1 February 1941, command afloat in the high echelons was vested in three Commanders in Chief, one of whom commanded the Asiatic Fleet, one the Pacific Fleet, and one the Atlantic Fleet, provision being made whereby one of these three, depending on the circumstances, would act as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, chiefly for purposes of standardization. In case two or more fleets operated together, he would coordinate their operations. At the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was also Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.

Almost immediately after our entry in the war it became apparent that for the purpose of exercising command all oceans must be regarded as one area, to the end that effective coordinated control and the proper distribution of our naval power might be realized. On 18 December 1941, therefore, the President changed this organization by making the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, separate and distinct and in addition to the other three Commanders in Chief, and ordered the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, established in the Navy Department in Washington.

As of 1 January 1942, Admiral H.R. Stark was Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral (now Fleet Admiral) E.J. King was Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral T.C. Hart was Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral (now Fleet Admiral) C.W. Nimitz, who relieved Admiral H.E. Kimmel late in December 1941, was Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R.E. Ingersoll was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

In March 1942, (coincident with my appointment as such) the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were combined with the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Admiral Stark, who had so ably performed the duties of Chief of Naval Operations during the vital period preceding the war, became commander of United States Naval Forces in Europe. This move was accompanied by a number of adjustments in the Navy Department organization, calculated, among other things, to facilitate the logistic support of the forces afloat by providing for its coordination. Except for the fact that the Asiatic Fleet ceased to exist as such in June 1942, that basic organization of the United States Fleet and supporting activities is still in effect. In the spring of 1942, however, and from time to time thereafter, independent commands were established directly under the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Organization Within Each Fleet

In time of peace, for purposes of standardization, and to facilitate training and administration, our forces afloat operate under what is known as a type organization. Each fleet is subdivided according to types of ships in that fleet (this includes shore-based naval aircraft), and in general, the officers assigned to command each subdivision are the next echelon below the Commander in Chief of a fleet. The "type commands" are primarily for administrative purposes. For operations, vessels and aircraft of appropriate types are formed into operating commands known as "task forces."

Sea Frontiers

As of 1 February 1941, Naval Coastal Frontiers consisted of one or more Naval Districts, depending on their geographical location, and Naval Coastal Frontier forces were administrative and task organizations. Commanders of those forces were responsible to the Navy Department for administrative purposes and to the Chief of Naval Operations for task purposes.

On 20 December 1941 the operating forces of Naval Coastal Frontiers were placed under the command of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet

On 6 February 1942 Naval Coastal Frontiers became Sea Frontiers, and Commanders of Sea Frontiers were made responsible to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, for that portion of their commands comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated as Sea Frontier forces. For the portion comprising ships and aircraft allocated by the Chief of Naval Operations as local defense forces, they were made responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The foregoing change in designation of Naval Coastal Frontiers is not to be confused with the designation "Coastal Frontier." The latter, of which Sea Frontiers form a part, are coastal divisions with geographically coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a naval officer exercise command over their respective forces and activities.

In continental United States there are four sea frontiers: the Eastern, covering the Atlantic seaboard; the Gulf, covering the Gulf of Mexico; the Western, which takes in the southern part of the Pacific Coast; and the North West, which covers the northern part of the Pacific Coast.

Advance Base Units

Early in the war the Navy undertook a large expansion of its system of advance bases, many of which represented the consolidation of gains made by combat units. Depending on the circumstances, that is to say, whether they were gained as a result of a raid or as a result of an advance, the permanency of their construction was varied to meet the situation. In the south and central Pacific, the entire campaign thus far has been a battle for advance bases where we can establish supply ports, ship repair facilities and landing fields to act as a backstop for a continuing offensive.

Advance bases range in size from small units for the maintenance and repair of PT boats, manned by a handful of officers and men to major bases comprising floating

drydocks, pattern ships, foundries, fully equipped machine shops, and electrical shops, staffed by thousands of specialists. Some of these bases are general purpose bases; others are established for special purposes. Convoy escort bases, located at terminals of the convoy routes, provide fuel, stores, ammunition, and repair facilities for merchant ships and their escort vessels. Rest and recuperation centers afford naval personnel facilities for relaxation and recreation after they return from combat zones. Air stations provide the facilities of an aircraft carrier on an expanded scale.

Once bases are built, they must be maintained. The problem of supplying the Navy's worldwide system of advance bases is one of great complexity, requiring a high degree of administrative coordination and attention to the most minute detail. Food, clothing, fuel, ammunition, spare parts, tools, and many types of special equipment must be made available in sufficient quantities and at the proper times to maintain the fighting efficiency of the fleet.

In view of the difficulties involved, the arrangements made for the procurement and distribution of supplies to advance bases have been extremely effective. New methods have been improvised and shortcuts devised to simplify procedures and expedite deliveries. Among other devices adopted is the mail order catalogue system. Through use of the Navy's "functional component catalogue," it is possible to order all the parts and equipment needed to set up any type of base from a small weather observation post to a fully equipped airfield or Navy yard.

As our forces advance, new bases must be established and economy of personnel and material demands that this be accomplished largely by stripping the old bases that have been left behind as the front is extended. This process is known as "rolling up the back areas."

Fighting Efficiency

When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the forces comprising the Atlantic Fleet had been engaged with Axis submarines, but the forces comprising the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets had not been previously engaged in combat. In the case of all ships everywhere, the transition from a state of peace to a state of war involved a great number of immediate changes, some of which could not possibly be made until our ships had been in action. For example, we profited from experiences gained after the war started with respect to the use of certain of our weapons in actual combat. Such things as depth charges and explosive charges in torpedoes and shells were put to the real test by our forces, and all personnel have become accordingly familiar with their handling and use. We also learned from experience the best practice in such matters as the painting and preservation of the interior of ships, camouflage, deficiencies and improvement of equipment, and from time to time what new contributions were of value. The most valuable of all experience has been that gained with respect to the operational technique in such fields as air combat, amphibious operations, and escort Of convoys.

The war was also the real test of the training methods we had followed in time of peace particularly the exercise of initiative by officers. As used in connection with the exercise of command, initiative means freedom to act, but it does not mean freedom to act in an off-hand or casual manner. It does not mean freedom to disregard or

depart unnecessarily from standard procedures or practices or instructions. There is no degree of being "independent" of the other component parts of the whole--the fleet. It means freedom to act only after all of one's resources in education, training, experience, skill and understanding have been brought to bear on the work in hand. This requires intense application in order that what is to be done shall be done as a correlated part of a connected whole--much as a link of a chain or the gear within a machine.

In other words, our officers had been indoctrinated and were now in larger measure on their own. Most of those officers understood perfectly the transition that becomes automatic when we passed from the peacetime to the wartime status, but it was thought desirable to define and emphasize the standards expected in time of war, not only to confirm their understanding, but for the benefit of newcomers. Without correct exercise of the principle calling for initiative on the part of the subordinate, decentralization, which is so essential, and which is premised on division of labor, will not work.

Calculated Risk

The ability of a naval commander to make consistently sound military decisions is the result of a combination of attributes. The natural talent of the individual, his temperament, his reactions in emergencies, his courage, and his professional knowledge all contribute to his proficiency and to the accuracy of his judgment. We have spent years training our officers to think clearly and for themselves, to the end that when entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions in time of war they would be fully qualified.

One of the mental processes that has become almost a daily responsibility for all those in command is that of calculating the risk involved in a given course of action. That may mean the risks attendant upon disposition of forces, such as had to be taken before the Battle of Midway, when an erroneous evaluation might have left us in a most unfavorable strategic position; the risks of losses in contemplated engagements, such as the Battle of Guadalcanal on 13-14-15 November 1942; the risks of success or failure dependent upon correct evaluation of political conditions, of which the North African landings are an example, and a host of others.

Calculating risks does not mean taking a gamble. It is more than figuring the odds. It is not reducible to a formula. It is the analysis of all factors which collectively indicate whether or not the consequences to ourselves will be more than compensated for by the damage to the enemy or interference with his plans. Correct calculation of risks, by orderly reasoning, is the responsibility of every naval officer who participates in combat, and many who do not. It is a pleasure to report that almost universally that responsibility is not only accepted, but sought, and that there have been few cases where it has not been properly discharged.

Logistics

The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics. The

Plate 4. Munitions vs. Manpower vs. The Eight Fronts, April 1942

the Army--of course--have presented problems nothing short of colossal, and have required the most careful and intricate planning. The profound effect of logistic problems on our strategic decisions is described elsewhere in this report, but to all who do not have to traverse them, the tremendous distances, particularly those in the Pacific, are not likely to have full significance. It is no easy matter in a global war to have the right materials in the right places at the right times in the right quantities.

Superimposed on the shipping requirements for the overhead of logistic needs has been the transportation of Army troops and the demands of lend-lease. The combination of circumstances has made shipping a question of primary importance which has been reflected in the shipbuilding industry and the merchant marine.

When war was declared, an immediate estimate of the situation with respect to material was made, as a result of which we could see that, no matter how much material was produced within the next year, it would not be enough. Therefore, with the idea of doing the first thing first, every effort was made to produce as much material as possible of all kinds, with the idea that as the war progressed our estimates could be revised to fit our needs. Stock piles of spare parts and materials needed for routine maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft were therefore established at advance bases, additional supplies being delivered under regular schedule.

Plate 4 is an over-generalization of the situation which existed in April 1942 with respect to the relationships involving munitions, manpower, and the eight fronts. From an examination of the diagram it will be seen that in order to keep our operating forces balanced in such a way as to conform to our planned operations, we had to maintain a continuous flow of munitions and manpower from sources of supply. The quantities involved, of course, had to be varied in accordance with the importance of any particular front, that is to say, the urgency of a particular campaign or operation. It is interesting to note that the United States was, and is, the only nation represented as having a full supply of both munitions and manpower.

It became possible to anticipate the needs for material much more accurately after we had been in the war a little over a year, and numerous changes were made in the methods of controlling the flow to the operating forces.

In supplying the forces afloat with the material they need, different methods are required. For example, spare parts and materials can be put on a regular schedule, but in distributing battle damage spares, which consist of complete units of pumps, turbines, boilers, turbo generators, steering gear and other assemblies, it has been found advantageous to keep them in stock at depots in the United States, and to effect immediate delivery to points where they are needed. For example, on one occasion a damaged submarine put into a distant base for extensive replacement of her main drive controls and power cables. Within thirty-six hours after receiving the information covering her needs a transport plane loaded with nine tons of parts took off for the advance base.

Character

While every kind of naval warfare has been experienced, with naval air power more often than not predominating, the war to date has to a degree become characterized

by numerous amphibious operations--a method of warfare with which the Japanese had had considerable experience. Our previous conclusions that this type of warfare required a technique of its own involving the closest coordination of all forces engaged--land, sea and air--have been confirmed. The very exigencies of such operations have done much to promote effective cooperation between those forces, and they have also made all hands realize that the uniform they wear signifies first that they are members of United States forces, and second that they are members of a particular unit of those forces. The inevitable solution to successful amphibious warfare is unified command, under which system all those participating are under the command of the individual best qualified to conduct the operation regardless of his status in our armed forces.

Strategy

The trend of events during the two years following the outbreak of war in Europe indicated that the war would eventually engulf the United States and become global in all its aspects. In keeping with that trend, the growing truculence of Japan and the continuous clash of Japan's policies with the policies of the United States made it likely that that country would enter the war at the most propitious moment. Because of that attitude, we were forced to retain the major part of our naval strength in the Pacific, in spite of the unfavorable situation in Europe reflecting the possibility of the need of our naval strength in the Atlantic. We were therefore placed in an unfavorable strategic position, in that our naval forces at that time were not adequate to meet the demands in both oceans should we be forced into the war.

The sudden treacherous attack by Japan, which resulted in heavy losses to us, made our unfavorable strategic position at the outbreak of war even worse than we had anticipated. Had we not suffered those losses, however, our fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people supposed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and Support it, would have been disastrous.

Although we had made some progress, and had for some months been increasing our defenses in the Western Hemisphere, our armed forces and our production were not adequately expanded and developed to permit our taking the overall offensive in any theater. The Army ground and air forces and our shipping were not yet prepared to move overseas in sufficient strength for an offensive, and the Navy, even without the losses sustained at Pearl Harbor, could not alone carry the war to the enemy. We were therefore forced to assume the defensive in both oceans, while preparations for an amphibious war were intensified.

Our strategy in the Atlantic involved maintaining our lines of communications to Great Britain and to future bases of operations against our enemies in Europe, in addition to insuring the security of the Western Hemisphere. The control of the Atlantic was being vigorously contested by German submarine and air forces, while the Axis face forces constituted a threat of no mean proportions. To meet the situation we trained men and manned ships and aircraft as soon as we could in order to assume the

offensive. By the end of 1942, we were ready and moved overseas in force with the Army.

By the spring of 1943, the war against German submarines in the Atlantic had turned in our favor and we were fully on the offensive in that area. Furthermore, we had built up to our strategic requirements for the transportation and support of our Army ground and air forces overseas and the reinforcement of British naval forces guarding against the outbreak of the German surface forces. Coincident with this expansion and general increase in our strength, there was a rapid buildup in the forces employed in the Pacific.

At the outbreak of the war with Japan, we were initially placed on the defensive, but while we were so engaged we made all preparations to seize the initiative as soon as possible and embark on our own offensive operations. To that end, our fleet supported the operations of the Allied forces throughout the Pacific in retaining key positions and preventing further encroachments by the enemy.

In view of the absence of any well developed bases in Australia and in the South Pacific Islands between Australia and the United States one of our first problems was to build bases which would serve as links in the line of communications. Early in 1942, therefore, after surveying the situation, Efate, Espiritu Santo, and certain islands in the Fijis and New Caledonia were selected for advance bases, and developed in varying degree to suit our purposes. The establishment of those bases, which have been in constant use as fuel and troop staging stations and as distribution points for material and supplies, was in large measure responsible for our ability to stand off the Japanese in their advance toward Australia and New Zealand. Without them we should have been at such a disadvantage that it is doubtful if the enemy could have been checked.

While essential sea and air communications to Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and other intermediate positions were being established and protected, our submarines immediately took the offensive in enemy waters. Also during this period, our naval air task forces were instrumental in attacking enemy positions and in turning back enemy seaborne forces, particularly in the Coral Sea and off Midway. The enemy succeeded in making an incursion into the western Aleutians.

The actions in the Coral Sea and at Midway did much to wrest the initiative from the enemy and slow down further advance. Our first really offensive operation was the seizure of Guadalcanal in August 1942. This campaign was followed by a general offensive made possible by increases in our amphibious forces and in our naval forces in general, which has continued to gain momentum on the entire Pacific front. At the end of February 1944, the enemy had been cleared from the Aleutians, had been pushed well out of the Solomons, had been ejected from the Gilberts and western Marshalls, was being attacked elsewhere, and was forced to adopt a defensive delaying strategy. Meanwhile, our own positions in the Pacific had been strengthened.

At the end of February 1944, therefore, we were in a position to support our submarines, which had been on the offensive from the beginning of the war, with strong naval forces, some of which were ground and air forces not needed on the European front. A similar situation exists in the Atlantic, in that the sea lanes are under our control and we are definitely on the offensive in that area.

The Pacific Theater

The war in the Pacific may be regarded as having four stages:

1. The defensive, when we were engaged almost exclusively in protecting our shores and our lines of communication from the encroachments of the enemy.

2. The defensive-offensive, during which, although our operations were chiefly defensive in character, we were able nevertheless to take certain offensive measures.

3. The offensive-defensive, covering the period immediately following our seizure of the initiative, but during which we still had to use a large part of our forces to defend our recent gains.

4. The offensive, which began when our advance bases were no longer seriously threatened and we became able to attack the enemy at places of our own choosing.

The Defensive

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese withdrew from the central Pacific and for the time being, except for the capture of the islands of Guam and Wake, confined their major attacks to the Philippine Islands and Netherlands East Indies. Our own operations were of necessity limited to that line of enemy advance. Guam was easily taken. Our forces on Wake, after gallant resistance which took a large toll of enemy attacking forces, far superior in strength, were overcome at the end of December.

Except for the forces in the Philippine Islands under General (now General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur, our strength in the western Pacific area consisted chiefly of the Asiatic Fleet, a few aviation units, and the garrisons of marines at Guam and Wake already referred to. The small Asiatic Fleet commanded by Admiral Thomas C. Hart included the heavy cruiser Houston, the light cruiser Marblehead, 13 overage destroyers, some 29 submarines, two squadrons of Catalinas comprising Patrol Wing Ten, and a few gunboats and auxiliaries which could not be counted on for combat. With this force (plus the light cruiser Boise, which happened to be in Asiatic waters when the war warning was received) we undertook to delay the enemy's advance until such time as we could muster sufficient strength to put up any real resistance. In so far as completely stopping the advance was concerned, the campaign was foredoomed, but it nevertheless contributed materially to the ultimate check of the Japanese advance, and the energy and gallantry of the officers and men participating constitute a remarkable chapter in the history of naval warfare.

During the latter part of November, when the Japanese advances along the coast of Indo-china indicated the approach of a crisis, Admiral Hart had sent Marblehead and eight destroyers to Borneo. Likewise, Houston, Boise, and the destroyer tender Black Hawk, had been dispatched to operate in southern waters. On the evening of 8 December therefore, after the Japanese had bombed our airfields and destroyed many of General MacArthur's planes, our submarines and motor torpedo boats, which were still in Philippine waters, were left with the task of impeding the enemy's advance. On 10 December the navy yard at Cavite, which had long been recognized as insecure,

PLATE 5-THE DEFENSIVE PHASE IN THE PACIFIC

1. BATTLE OF MAKASSAR STRAIT, 24 JANUARY 1942: Japanese forces moving southward are attacked by U.S. destroyers.

2. RAID ON THE MARSHALLS AND GILBERTS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942: U.S. carriers and cruisers attack enemy bases.

3. BADOENG STRAIT, 19-20 FEBRUARY 1942: Combined forces under Rear Admiral Doorman, R.N.N. engage Japanese force moving on Bali.

4. ACTION OFF RABAUL, 20 FEBRUARY 1942: Aerial engagement near the enemy's major base in New Britain.

5. RAID ON WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUARY 1942: A U.S. Task Force bombards a former American outpost. JAVA SEA ACTION, 27 FEBRUARY 1942: Combined forces attempt to intercept Japanese convoys. The end of organized Allied naval resistance in this phase of the war.

6. Houston AND Perth LOST, 1 MARCH 1942: The surviving cruisers of the combined force are lost in an action near Soenda Strait.

7. RAID ON SALAMAUA AND LAE, 10 MARCH 1942: Carriers attack enemy ships in recently occupied New Guinea bases.

8. RAID ON TULAGI, 4 May 1942: The opening blow of the Coral Sea actions. U.S. carrier-based aircraft attack Japanese ships in the newly occupied Solomons.

9. BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, 7-8 MAY 1942: Carriers exchange blows. Severe damage inflicted on the Japanese carrier force. Lexington is lost, but the Japanese advance is checked.

Plate 5. The Defensive Phase in the Pacific

was practically wiped out by an air attack which also damaged the submarine Sealion and the destroyer Peary; Sealion being destroyed by our own forces to prevent its capture. On the same day the Japanese effected landings on the islands, and thereafter all attempts to bring in effective quantities of supplies by sea proved unsuccessful. It should be noted, however, that on 10 December there were some 200,000 tons of Allied shipping in Manila Bay; most of it good, and some of it with valuable cargoes. All but one of these ships got clear, to the southward, under what amounted to cover by our surface forces, and escaped via the Sulu Sea and Makassar Strait. This was an important "save."

The holding of the Army's positions on Bataan and Corregidor became only a question of time, and Rear Admiral F. W. Rockwell, who was in command of the local naval defense forces, moved with them to Corregidor on 26 December.

Admiral Hart set up his headquarters in the Netherlands East Indies. Shortly thereafter General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, of the British Army, arrived and assumed supreme command in that theater, whereupon Admiral Hart became the Commander of the Allied naval forces. Until Admiral Hart's arrival in Java, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) William A. Glassford commanded the surface ships in southern waters, assisted by Rear Admiral William R. Purnell and other members of the Fleet Staff. Up to this point (in so far as the Asiatic Fleet was concerned) the campaign was conducted in accordance with plans worked out in the Navy Department prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

The method adopted by the Japanese in making their advances through the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies was built around their air power. After building up their strength at a given base they would overcome the consistently inferior Allied air opposition at the next point of attack and then send along heavily screened amphibious forces to make landings. As a rule, the distances were too short to permit attack by our naval forces while the enemy was en route. As soon as the enemy were in control of a new area they would repair the airfields and gather forces for the next attack. These tactics were well adapted to the geography of the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies, particularly as there was almost a total absence of interior communications in the islands occupied.

In January 1942, therefore, the Japanese had overrun the Philippine Islands, and the greatest part of our strength was in the Netherlands East Indies, for which the Japanese were obviously headed. Our submarines and motor torpedo boats were engaged in slowing down the enemy advance to give us as much time as possible to get organized for the surface actions that were in prospect in the Java Sea.

The Java Sea Campaign

In that situation, Admiral Hart had to plan all our operations without air sup port except for a few Army bombers and a few fighters based on Java. Our PBY4's of Patrol Wing Ten were not suited for the type of operations in prospect, and as a matter of fact it was only the superb work of their pilots in the face of enemy fighters coupled with the mobility of our tenders that made their use possible.

By the end of December, the Japanese were preparing bases at Davao on Mindanao, and at Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago. From these points they moved south to

attack Menado on the northern tip of Celebes, Tarakan in northeastern Borneo, and shortly afterward Kema, with the obvious intention of moving down Molucca Strait toward Ambon, Kendari, and Makassar Strait. By 20 January they appeared to be ready to move against Balikpapan, on the east coast of Borneo.

Collecting the few ships at his disposal (until early February all British and Netherlands surface ships had to be used to escort troop convoys into Malaya) Admiral Hart decided upon a night torpedo attack. This was delivered off Balikpapan (the action became known officially as the Battle of Makassar Strait) early in the morning of 24 January by the destroyers John D. Ford, Parrott, Paul Jones and Pope under the command of Commander (now Captain) P.H. Talbot. Whatever the losses sustained by the enemy, the attack (one of four attempts by our cruisers and destroyers to come to grips with the enemy at sea) was brilliantly executed, and was responsible for the stalling of that particular force for some time at Balikpapan. Other amphibious forces, however, continued to advance eastward, and landed at Rabaul in New Britain and at Bougainville in the Solomons. New positions on the coast of Borneo were also seized by the enemy, and in the first few days of February they captured Ambon and began bombing Soerabaja and several other Javanese points.

In furtherance of the effort to delay the enemy drive, a striking force consisting of four cruisers and seven destroyers, about half of which were Netherlands and the other half American, was formed under the command of Rear Admiral Doorman of the Netherlands Navy. A large enemy convoy having gathered at Balikpapan, Admiral Doorman undertook to run up Madoera Strait into the Java Sea and deliver an attack, but our forces were discovered by Japanese planes and subjected to a prolonged bombing attack which prevented the carrying out of the plan. During this attack Houston suffered one direct hit which destroyed her number three turret and Marblehead was forced to retire to the south coast of Java to effect temporary repairs.

Continuing their advance, the Japanese attacked Palembang in southeast Sumatra and entered Banka Strait. Admiral Doorman's force, in a second effort to interfere with the enemy operation, was again forced to withdraw by enemy planes. By 14 February the Japanese in Borneo and Celebes were in a position to advance on Bali and eastern Java, and Japanese forces in Sumatra were also threatening Java.

At this point in the campaign, in accordance with previous agreements providing that it would be conducted by the Netherlands, Admiral Hart relinquished operational command of Allied naval forces to Vice Admiral Helfrich of the Netherlands Navy, and a few days later General Wavell turned over his command and left the area.

Havin